President Trump has consistently embraced his image as a maximalist, making significant demands, creating crises, and initiating high-stakes negotiations.
However, he increasingly finds himself backing down and merely declaring victory. His adversaries appear to be catching on, fine-tuning their strategies based on Mr. Trump’s consistent patterns and his unabashedly transactional approach to diplomacy.
This dynamic has repeatedly surfaced in recent weeks as Mr. Trump has, to varying extents, retreated from his ambitions to redefine Gaza as the “Riviera of the Middle East,” transform Canada into the 51st state, and subdue China through tariffs.
Now, two distinct challenges are emerging. The first concerns Mr. Trump’s alignment: will he side with America’s longstanding allies or with President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia regarding the preservation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and safety in any cease-fire agreement? The second, involving Iran, may reveal whether he is genuinely prepared to allow Israel to strike Iran—or to participate himself—if he fails to secure a superior nuclear deal compared to what President Barack Obama negotiated, while also blocking Iran’s path to a nuclear bomb.
Both negotiations differ from tariff discussions in their numeric symmetry. Thousands, if not millions, of lives could hang in the balance. Both are rooted in decades-old grievances dating back to the Iranian revolution and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Moreover, Russia and Iran seem to be refining their strategies after observing Mr. Trump. Representatives from these nations are suggesting to Mr. Trump’s negotiator, Steve Witkoff, that there may be investment prospects for Americans if the U.S. relaxes its demands. Mr. Witkoff, mirroring Mr. Trump, also has a background in real estate.
China serves as an intriguing example of Mr. Trump adopting a maximalist strategy only to later concede. In this instance, Beijing also appeared to be observing and adapting to Mr. Trump’s strategies.
When Mr. Trump imposed tariffs on Chinese goods over a month ago, he cautioned Beijing’s leaders, as well as others affected by his “reciprocal” tariffs, “Do not retaliate.” Resistance was futile. The most favorable deals would be available to those who arrived in Washington early with a list of compromises.
President Xi Jinping of China disregarded that advice, retaliating with additional tariffs until the total on China’s imports to the U.S. reached an astounding 145 percent. For five weeks, Mr. Xi followed a path toward mutually assured economic devastation. Inflation and shortages loomed large as cargo ships turned back.
It took Mr. Trump about 40 days to retreat, agreeing to an initial 30 percent tariff—still significantly high—with no substantial Chinese concessions apart from an agreement to negotiate over the subsequent 90 days.
This retreat was so notable that it prompted a predictable market rally stretching over two days, Mr. Trump’s ultimate measure of approval.
Yet it also clarified Washington’s objectives. Since Mr. Trump began imposing tariffs on both U.S. adversaries and allies, key questions have arisen: Does he view tariffs as a means to reshape global trading dynamics? To push for re-industrialization in America, even for products that might not make sense to produce domestically? Or is he envisioning a new income source to supplement taxes for a government that has persistently overspent for three decades?
At various times, Mr. Trump has suggested all three scenarios are in play. However, it now appears clearer that what truly excites him is wielding tariffs as a negotiating weapon and making his minimum 10 percent tariff on all foreign goods appear attractive, even if it burdens consumers. Everything above that threshold is highly negotiable.
“President Trump’s willingness to employ any economic strategy necessary to bring our trading partners to the negotiating table seems to be yielding short-term results,” remarked Michael B. Froman, who served as the United States Trade Representative under Mr. Obama, on Tuesday. “Numerous negotiations are ongoing, and concepts for a plan have been agreed upon,” he noted.
“The dilemma is the endgame, and at what cost?” queried Mr. Froman, now leading the Council on Foreign Relations. “Will his negotiation tactics cause enduring harm, making it harder to collaborate with partners on other crucial priorities, thus undermining potential economic victories?”
Regarding China, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent outlined specific goals that closely resembled the Biden administration’s rationale for implementing export controls on chips and related manufacturing equipment destined for China, as well as for blocking the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei from the U.S. market.
“We do not aim for a broad decoupling from China,” Mr. Bessent stated on Monday during an appearance on CNBC. “Rather, we seek a decoupling for strategic essentials.”
He is now left with 90 days to figure out what that looks like and to see if China intensifies its crackdown on fentanyl exporters, a measure that traces back to the Biden era.
While these discussions might extend into the summer—the 90-day window will conclude in mid-August unless extended—it seems probable that pivotal developments will arise in the negotiations with Russia and Iran.
This past weekend, Mr. Trump hesitantly associated himself with another major demand directed at Russia. This request was articulated by Europe’s top leaders during their visit to Kyiv, following a call to the American president to identify the language. It mandated that Russia agree to a 30-day cease-fire by Monday.
Mr. Putin dismissed the deadline, wagering that he would face little consequence. Instead, he ordered drone strikes on Ukraine and proposed a negotiating session with Ukraine to occur on Thursday in Istanbul. Mr. Trump quickly endorsed this idea but abandoned the stipulation that a cease-fire must precede it, allowing Ukraine to negotiate without facing a Russian assault.
Mr. Trump offered on Monday to attend the talks himself while returning from the Middle East; however, it seems unlikely Mr. Putin will be present, reducing the event’s appeal. On Tuesday, Mr. Trump stated he would send Marco Rubio, who is currently serving dual roles as secretary of state and national security adviser, along with Mr. Witkoff and Keith Kellogg, his advisor on Ukraine.
Mr. Putin evidently recognizes that Mr. Trump is indifferent to the integrity of Ukraine’s borders or even the culpability for the invasion. (Shortly after taking office, Mr. Trump suggested that Ukraine was responsible, contributing to the explosive February confrontation with President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office.)
Much of the dialogue in Istanbul will likely center around the control of territories currently occupied by Russia, the extent to which Ukraine must significantly reduce its armaments, and whether NATO should withdraw both troops and weaponry from close proximity to Russian borders. Mr. Zelensky has asserted his intention to attend, raising the possibility of a standoff. As noted by Stephen Sestanovich, a Russia expert and former diplomat who authored the book “Maximalist” a decade ago, following the Oval Office disagreement, “the Ukrainians have found a way to merge gratitude with firmness and make it advantageous for them.”
Recently, Mr. Putin has also hinted at cooperative Russian-American ventures in energy and mining, which could entice a deal-seeking president to achieve something beyond a mere pursuit of a Nobel Peace Prize from a Ukraine agreement. Mr. Witkoff expressed enthusiasm for this idea during an interview with Tucker Carlson.
Currently, the Iranians are attempting a similar strategy.
After several weeks of mixed messages regarding Iran’s potential to continue enriching uranium, a critical component for nuclear weaponry, Mr. Witkoff recently stated in an interview with Breitbart, “We believe they cannot have enrichment, they cannot have centrifuges, and they cannot have any capability that allows them to develop a weapon.”
The demands appear rather straightforward.
Yet the Iranians argue that Mr. Witkoff adopted a much softer stance in the negotiation room last weekend, not completely ruling out some nuclear activities in Iran. Simultaneously, several Iranian and other officials report that the Iranians have begun proposing ideas for joint nuclear energy projects, possibly involving the U.S. or regional rival Saudi Arabia. The primary condition is that all sanctions would be lifted, allowing Iran to maintain some capabilities that Mr. Witkoff, and recently Mr. Trump, have indicated must be abandoned or dismantled.
On Tuesday in Riyadh, the Saudi capital, Mr. Trump mentioned he was extending “a new path and a significantly brighter option for a hopeful future” to Iran. He concluded with, “Now is the moment for them to make a choice.”